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1. DANIEL B. FELKER ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR DOCUMENT DESIGNERS 16
(1981); see also Joseph Kimble, Plain English: A Charter for Clear
Writing, 9 THOMAS M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 12 (1992) (recommend-
ing summaries as an element of plain language); Joseph Kimble,
Writing for Dollars, Writing to Please, 6 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 1,
6 (1996-1997) (again recommending summaries).
2. George Rose Smith, A Primer of Opinion Writing for Four New
Judges, 21 ARK. L. REV. 197, 204 (1967); see also RUGGERO J.
ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 72-77 (1990) (citing Smith with
approval but also recommending a conclusion in the first para-
graph).
3. Bryan A. Garner, The Deep Issue: A New Approach to Framing Legal
Questions, 5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 1, 4 (1994-1995) (citation
omitted).
4. People v. Daniel, 609 N.W.2d 557, 557-58 (Mich. 2000).
If you value clarity, if you insist on lighting the way for yourreader, then you’ll provide good summaries where theybelong in just about every piece of legal writing:  up front.
You should always have one at the beginning or near the begin-
ning, and if you’re dealing with multiple issues, you should
have one at the beginning of each issue.  Call them what you
will—summaries, overviews, brief answers, thesis statements,
synopses—they are central to clear writing:  
A vast amount of empirical research has studied
the effects of overviews on learning from written
prose.  The research support for this principle is
broad and consistent. . . .   [T]he support is suffi-
ciently broad to establish the general value of
overviews for understanding written text in any
environment and for any audience.1
All legal writing should be front-loaded.  It should start with
a capsule version of the analysis.  It should practice the art of
summarizing.  
SUMMARIES IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS — 
THE OPENING PARAGRAPHS
An often quoted article on writing opinions gives this
advice:
The importance of the first paragraph cannot be
over-emphasized. . . .  The readability of an opinion
is nearly always improved if the opening paragraph
(occasionally it takes two) answers three questions.
First, what kind of case is this:  Divorce, foreclo-
sure, workmen’s compensation, and so on?  Second,
what roles, plaintiff or defendant, did the appellant
and the appellee have in the trial court?  Third,
what was the trial court’s decision?  A fourth ques-
tion, What are the issues on appeal?, should also be
answered unless the contentions are too numerous
to be easily summarized.2
The advice is incomplete in two respects.  It doesn’t make
clear that the court should set out the deep issue or issues, not
just the superficial issues.  And just as important, the advice
doesn’t say that the court should summarize its answer to the
deep issues.  
The term “deep issue” was coined by Bryan Garner, who
explains that “the surface issue does not disclose the decisional
premises; the deep issue makes them explicit.  It yields up
what Justice Holmes once called the ‘implements of deci-
sion.’”3 Garner identifies 12 categories of judicial openers
along a continuum from “no issue” to “surface issue” to “deep
issue.”  I can hardly add to his exposition, except to say that
there will usually be degrees or levels of deepness to choose
from and that briefs and memos may require slightly different
choices than opinions will.  I’ll explain these two points more
fully in the next two sections.  
Meanwhile, let’s remind ourselves what clarity—maximal
clarity—demands of a judicial opener:  (1) the crucial facts; (2)
the deep issue, stated explicitly or implicitly in terms of the
pertinent legal rule or requirement; and (3) the answer, which
may involve simply applying the pertinent rule, or choosing
between two possible rules, or sometimes applying an even
deeper rule that I’ll call the dispositive rule.  Note that the
answer goes beyond a mere yes or no; it includes the reason-
ing.  All this may seem complicated, but you’ll have no trouble
identifying these parts in a good opener.  
The only trouble is in finding good ones.  (Are you sur-
prised?)  For instance, I looked at Volume 462 of the Michigan
Reports, the most recent bound volume as I was writing.  The
first four opinions are per curiam opinions, with first para-
graphs like this (it’s one of the better ones):  
The defendant was convicted of delivering
between 50 and 225 grams of cocaine, which pre-
sumptively requires a prison term of ten to twenty
years.  The trial court concluded that there were sub-
stantial and compelling reasons for departing from
the statutory mandate, however, and imposed a
prison term of five to twenty years.  We agree with the
dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals that the trial
court considered an inappropriate factor in conclud-
ing that a departure was warranted.  We thus reverse
and remand to the trial court for resentencing.4
But the deep issue there was whether a defendant’s expres-
sion of remorse is an objective and verifiable factor.  It could
have been included so easily:  “We agree with the dissenting
judge in the Court of Appeals that the trial court inappropri-
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omitted).
8. Wills v. State Farm Ins. Co., 564 N.W.2d 488 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997).
ately considered a factor that was not objective and verifi-
able—defendant’s expression of remorse.”  That one sentence
identifies the pertinent rule and applies it to the crucial facts.
After the four per curiams comes an authored opinion with
these first two paragraphs:
The question in these consolidated appeals is
whether the state of Michigan was barred by [a
statute] from indicting defendants for conspiracy to
possess with intent to deliver more than 650 grams
of a mixture containing cocaine when they had pre-
viously been convicted in federal court in Florida of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more
than five kilograms of cocaine.
I would hold that the state prosecution was not
barred by [the statute] because conspiracy charges are
not a violation of “this article” (article 7 of the Public
Health Code) for purposes of the statute.  The statute
does not apply because the conspiracy charges arose
under chapter 24 of the Penal Code, not under article
7 of the Public Health Code.  Therefore, I would
reverse the judgments of the trial court and Court of
Appeals and reinstate defendants’ convictions.5
That just about gets it.  That gets to the deep issue
(although, unfortunately, (1) you have to read a footnote to
find the statutory rule against double convictions for violating
“this article,” and (2) the initial paragraph is a 62-word sen-
tence in reverse chronological order).  Notice the two uses of
because in the second paragraph.  That’s a good sign.  Because
is the word that signals an answer, the word that almost forces
the writer to explain. 
I spent a long day reading all the opinions in Volume 462.
By my reckoning, only 9 of the 27 opinions set out the deep
issue, coupled with an answer, in the opening paragraphs.
Here’s another one that does; the court is choosing from possi-
ble rules:
In this premises liability case the plaintiff, Violet
Moeller, was injured when she tripped over a con-
crete tire stop in defendant church’s parking lot.
Plaintiff was visiting the church to attend bible
study.  Plaintiff sued the church, alleging that the
defendant negligently placed the tire stops and
failed to provide adequate lighting in the parking
lot.
At trial, the jury was instructed on the obliga-
tions property owners owe to licensees.  The jury
returned a verdict in favor of the church.  The Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a
new trial after determining that the trial court erred
by instructing the jury on the obligations owed to
licensees rather than “public invitees” as defined in
2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 332, p. 176.
We granted leave in this case to determine the
proper standard of care owed to individuals on
church property for noncommercial purposes.  We
hold that the trial court correctly instructed the jury
that such individuals are licensees and not invitees.
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals deci-
sion and reinstate the trial court judgment in favor
of the church.6
This could have been shorter, though, especially since the
next section of the opinion is called “Factual and Procedural
Background.”  A revised version:  
In this premises-liability case, the plaintiff, Violet
Moeller, was injured when she tripped over a con-
crete tire stop in defendant church’s parking lot.  She
was visiting the church to attend bible study.  The
Court of Appeals determined that Moeller was not a
licensee but rather a “public invitee” as defined in 2
Restatement Torts, 2d, § 332, p. 176.  We disagree.
We hold that to become an invitee, a person must
show that the premises were held open for a com-
mercial purpose.  We reject the Restatement’s defin-
ition of “public invitee.”
Finally, here’s another incomplete opener:
We consider in this case the trial court’s decision
to suppress defendant’s voluntary confession on the
ground that defendant did not “knowingly and
intelligently” waive his Miranda rights.  We con-
clude that the trial court applied an erroneous legal
standard in assessing the validity of defendant’s
Miranda waiver.  Moreover, we conclude that the
waiver was valid.  Therefore, we reverse the trial
court’s decision suppressing defendant’s confession.7
This misses the crucial facts and the dispositive legal rule.
A revised version:
The defendant waived his Miranda rights and con-
fessed to murder.  According to a psychiatric expert,
he was delusional and believed that God would set
him free if he confessed.  The trial court concluded
that his waiver was not “knowing and intelligent”
[the pertinent rule].  But the court erred in focusing
on why the defendant confessed.  The proper test for
waiver is whether defendant understands the
Miranda rights [the dispositive rule], not whether he
understands the consequences of waiving them.  
LOOKING DEEPER INTO ONE OPINION
A few years ago, to test styles of opinion-writing, I rewrote
a fairly routine opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals.8 I
labeled one version X and the other version O, and sent them
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out randomly to several hundred Michigan lawyers.  I asked
the lawyers which opinion they preferred and why.  (For the
“why,” I included a list of possible reasons.)  Result:  61% of
251 lawyers preferred the revised version.
A full report on this study will appear in The Scribes Journal
of Legal Writing.  For now, suffice it to say that the revised
opinion followed a number of the guidelines for writing in
plain language:  break the material into sections and use head-
ings, organize by putting more important information before
less important, cite only the controlling cases, omit other
unnecessary detail, use topic sentences that advance the analy-
sis, keep the paragraphs short, use plain words, and provide
summaries at the beginning and at the major breaking points.  
Now, the results of my study were certainly not produced by
any one change or technique.  Still, the difference between the
two opinions’ first paragraphs, where the writer should get
down to the nitty-gritty, is striking:
Original:  
Plaintiff Robert Wills filed a declaratory judg-
ment action against defendant State Farm Insurance
Company to determine whether defendant has a
duty to pay benefits under the uninsured motorist
provisions found in plaintiff’s policy with defen-
dant.  Pursuant to the parties’ stipulated statement
of facts, the trial court granted summary disposition
in plaintiff’s favor upon finding coverage where
gunshots fired from an unidentified automobile
passing plaintiff’s vehicle caused plaintiff to drive off
the road and suffer injuries.  Defendant appeals as of
right.  We reverse and remand.
Revised:
Summary
Robert Wills was injured when someone drove
by him and fired shots toward his car, causing him
to swerve into a tree.  He filed a declaratory-judg-
ment action to determine whether State Farm had to
pay him uninsured-motorist benefits.  The issue is
whether there was a “substantial physical nexus”
between the unidentified car and Wills’s car.  The
trial court answered yes and granted a summary dis-
position for Wills.  We disagree and reverse.  We do
not find a substantial physical nexus between the
two cars, because the bullets were not projected by
the unidentified car itself.
Why does the original fall short?  It doesn’t get to the deep
issue.  And it doesn’t get to the answer, which in this case
involves a deeper, dispositive rule—namely, that “substantial
physical nexus” requires contact with something that the
phantom car itself projected.  
Let me explain what I mean by levels of deepness.  All legal
analysis is based, explicitly or implicitly, on the deductive rea-
soning that we recognize as a syllogism.  Often, the minor
premise of the syllogism involves reasoning by analogy.  In the
case I tested, there are four syllogisms; the minor premise of
each one depends for its validity on the deeper syllogism that
follows it.  In the figures below, the a, b, and c stand for major
premise, minor premise, and conclusion.  The sentences are not
smooth, but I believe that the forms are correct.
1. a. A policyholder must show injury arising from the
use of an uninsured motor vehicle to recover
under the policy.
b. The policyholder, Wills, cannot show bodily
injury arising from the use of an uninsured motor
vehicle.
c. Therefore, the policyholder cannot recover under
the policy.
2. a. Under the policy, a vehicle whose driver is
unknown and which “strikes” the insured’s vehi-
cle is an uninsured motor vehicle.
b. The other vehicle had an unknown driver, but it
didn’t strike the insured’s vehicle.
c. Therefore, the other vehicle was not an unin-
sured motor vehicle.
3.  a. According to previous decisions involving indi-
rect physical contact, a “substantial physical
nexus” between the unidentified car and the
object it casts off or projects is required for “strik-
ing” the insured’s vehicle.
b. There was no substantial physical nexus between
the unidentified car and the object it projected.
c. Therefore, the unidentified car did not strike the
insured’s vehicle.
4. a. The object must be projected by the unidentified
car itself to meet the requirement of a “substan-
tial physical nexus.”
b. The bullets were not projected by the unidenti-
fied car itself.
[Analogy:  This case is like another one in which
someone in the unidentified car shot the policy-
holder while he stood beside his car.  This case is
distinguishable from cases in which the unidenti-
fied car threw a rock or dropped a piece of metal
on the road.]
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c. Therefore, the requirement of “substantial
physical nexus” is not met.  
Now you see what’s wrong with the original first paragraph.
Although it does state the crucial facts, it barely gets to the first
level of reasoning, the first syllogism; it just concludes, baldly
and superficially, that plaintiff has no uninsured-motorist cov-
erage.  The revised version, on the other hand, gets down to
the last syllogism.  It gets down to the ratio decidendi, the dis-
positive rule.
SUMMARIES IN BRIEFS AND MEMOS
Good summaries in briefs and memos will contain the same
three elements that opinions do:  the crucial facts, the deep
issue, and the answer.  The differences are mainly structural:
in briefs and memos, the issue is stated explicitly and the
answer follows in a separate part.  This may, in turn, present a
choice of how deep to go into the issue.
Let me illustrate with that uninsured-motorist case, Wills.
It’s mundane, but typically mundane, and thus a good example.
Suppose you were stating the issue in the insurance com-
pany’s brief.  (Incidentally, I’ll follow Garner’s sensible advice
to not cram everything into a single sentence.9)  You might
start the issue with these facts:  “Robert Wills was injured
when somebody drove by him and fired shots toward his car,
causing him to swerve into a tree.  Only the bullets—and noth-
ing from the unidentified car itself—struck Wills’s car.”  Then,
as you round out the issue, you have a choice about how deep
to go in the sentences that follow those first two.  Here are the
possibilities, from surface issues to increasingly deeper issues:
• Can Wills recover uninsured-motorist benefits?
• Can Wills show that his injury arose from “the use
of an uninsured motor vehicle” as defined in his
policy?
• To recover uninsured-motorist benefits under his
policy, Wills must show that the unidentified car
“struck” his car.  Can Wills make that showing?
• To recover uninsured-motorist benefits under his
policy, Wills must show that the unidentified car
“struck” his car.  And according to cases involving
indirect “striking,” there must be a “substantial
physical nexus” between the cars.  Can Wills show
a substantial physical nexus?
• To recover uninsured-motorist benefits under his
policy, Wills must show that the unidentified car
“struck” his car.  And according to cases involving
indirect “striking,” there must be a “substantial
physical nexus” between the cars created by some-
thing that is projected by the unidentified car itself.
Can Wills show that the unidentified car itself pro-
jected the bullets that hit his car?
You can see that it’s increasingly difficult to frame the issue
concisely as you go deeper into the levels of analysis.  I would
probably settle for the third bullet dot.  Oddly enough, the
third formulation seems more persuasive than the fourth, with
its vague—and unhelpful—concept of “substantial physical
nexus.”  The third issue is more persuasive because the facts
(in the first two sentences) suggest no “striking.”  
After so stating the issue, you could answer as follows in the
Summary of Argument part of your brief:
Wills’s policy with State Farm provides coverage
for bodily injury “arising from the use of an unin-
sured motor vehicle.”  The policy defines an unin-
sured motor vehicle as one whose driver is
unknown and which “strikes” the insured’s vehicle.
In this case, the unidentified car did not strike
Wills’s car, even indirectly.  In other cases involving
indirect contact, the Court of Appeals has ruled that
the striking object must be cast off or projected from
the unidentified car itself; only then is there a “sub-
stantial physical nexus” between the two cars.  And
here the bullets that hit Wills’s car were not pro-
jected by the unidentified car itself, but by a gun.  
Later, of course, would come the Argument section, with a
point heading and another summary after the point heading.
(Some writing texts call this second summary a thesis state-
ment.)  Inevitably, the second summary will require some rep-
etition, but an adroit writer can minimize it.  Thus:  
Plaintiff Wills cannot show that the unidentified
car “struck” his car.  
Wills cannot show that the unidentified car
“struck” his car, as his policy requires him to do,
because he cannot show that the unidentified car
itself fired the bullets.  It’s not enough that the bul-
lets came from a gun fired by someone riding in the
car.  
Here is the policy language at issue . . . .
Now, let’s briefly go back.  How would you frame the issue
for the plaintiff, who of course lost?  I suspect that he was try-
ing to distinguish an earlier case in which the policyholder was
hit by bullets shot from a moving car as he stood outside his
car; the bullets hit him, not his car.10 So plaintiff Wills might
frame his issue like this: 
Robert Wills was injured when somebody drove
by him and fired shots that hit his car, causing him
to swerve into a tree.  The shots from the unidenti-
fied car actually hit his car as they were both mov-
ing.  To recover uninsured-motorist benefits under
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his policy, Wills must show that the unidentified car
“struck” his car.  Can Wills make that showing?
Finally, how might you state the issue in an office memo—
that is, when you are in objective, not persuasive, mode?  In
the Wills case, the differences are not as substantial as they
would be in a more complicated case, with messier, conflicting
facts and more arguable rules and policies.  So this will sound
familiar:
Robert Wills was injured when somebody drove
by him and fired shots that hit his car, causing him
to swerve into a tree.  To recover uninsured-motorist
benefits under his policy, Wills must show that the
unidentified car “struck” his car.  Can Wills make
that showing?
A Brief Answer, which should follow directly, will complete
the summary and send the reader down a marked path toward
a clear destination.  I’ll spare you this last example, though.
You have the idea by now.
SUMMARIES IN OTHER LEGAL DOCUMENTS
So far we have considered the kind of précis that should
appear up front in analytical writing.  But when it comes to the
field that we call drafting—contracts, wills, trusts, statutes,
rules, and the like—the summary will not capsulize the analy-
sis because there is no analysis.  Rather, the summary will take
the form of an introduction or overview.  
In a contract, for instance, the first paragraph (which is typ-
ically unnumbered), will identify the parties and the nature of
the contract:
This is a lease between McKinley Morganfield
(Landlord) and Chester Burnett (Tenant) for the
property at 123 Red Rooster Street.  The parties
agree as follows:
In addition, long contracts should have an informative table of
contents.  For that matter, any legal document that’s longer
than five or six pages will benefit from a table of contents.  
In statutes, ordinances, and rules, the summary will take the
form of a purpose clause.  Reed Dickerson, the father of legal
drafting in the United States, was skeptical about purpose
clauses.  He thought that most of them “wind up as pious
incantations of little practical value because what little infor-
mation they contain is usually inferable from the working
text.”11 But plain-language experts disagree, believing as they
do that most laws and legal documents should be drafted for
an ordinary literate reader, and not just for judges and other
lawyers.  Here are two main reasons why:  focusing on legal
readers perversely ignores the very subjects of the law, the
administrators and citizens it applies to; and by aiming to make
the law clear to ordinary readers, skilled drafters will usually
sharpen its meaning.12
One plain-language expert, Martin Cutts, has actually tested
the value of purpose clauses.  He rewrote an act of Parliament
and included the following in his “Introduction”:
1.1 The main purposes of this Act are to give a
customer: 
(a) the right to cancel a timeshare agreement
or timeshare credit agreement; and
(b) the right to receive information about the
terms of the agreement.  
The rest of this Act explains how and when
these rights apply.
1.2 This Act applies to a timeshare agreement or
timeshare credit agreement if, when the agree-
ment is being entered into, the customer,
seller, or lender is in the United Kingdom or
the agreement is to some extent governed by
the law of the United Kingdom or a part of the
United Kingdom.13
From his testing on law students, Cutts concluded that “an
introductory section, giving an overview of the main purpose
of the Act, is a great asset to readers (40% cited it as a source of
main points).”14
And that’s not all.  Cutts also included, at the end, a so-called
“Citizen’s Summary” of the act’s main substantive points.  This
summary was labeled as not part of the act and not to be used
by judges who interpret it.  In the testing, 97% of participants
said that a Citizen’s Summary should be provided in every act
of Parliament.15
That will be the day—when legislators and legislative drafters,
without fretting or finding reasons to avoid change, take extra
steps to make law clear to the people whose lives it governs. 
FINAL THOUGHTS ON OPINIONS
In judicial opinions with several issues, it may be difficult to
summarize each one in the opening paragraphs.  But with two
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opinion.  Although they appear first, they should be written
last.  More accurately, they should be completed and polished
last.  Start with the issue part of the summary, but hold off on
writing the answer part until the end.  For how can you sum-
marize your answer until you have worked through your
analysis?   You may eventually decide that your issue, too,
needs refining—or deepening.
The summary, then, both shapes and reflects the analysis.
The quality of the one affects the quality of the other.  Of all
the Michigan opinions cited earlier, the one that seemed to me
the most slippery was People v. Daoud.16 And I had the hardest
time summarizing the answer.  I’m not suggesting that sum-
marizing is easy.  But it’s bound to be easier with a clear opin-
ion.  Bad summaries are a bad sign.  
Joseph Kimble graduated from Amherst College
and the University of Michigan Law School. He
is a professor at Thomas Cooley Law School,
where he has taught legal writing for 17 years.
He is the editor of the “Plain Language” column
in the Michigan Bar Journal, the editor-in-chief
of The Scribes Journal of Legal Writing, and
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Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States. You can contact him at 
kimblej@cooley.edu.
or even three solid issues, you should be able to summarize in
no more than four tight paragraphs, allowing one for the facts if
you need it.  The paragraphs do have to be tight, though.
(Notice that my revised and meatier summaries of those
Michigan opinions were shorter or only a mite longer than the
originals.)  At the very least, you can usually state all the deep
issues, even if you can’t answer each one except to say, for
instance, that “we find no reversible error.”  At times, you can
summarize selectively:  “Penniman raises four issues on appeal,
two of which require careful review.”  And in any event, most
cases do not involve more than a couple of weighty issues.
As you realize by now, I don’t buy the notion that the sum-
mary must be only one or two paragraphs.  Typically, it will be.
But I don’t object to several short paragraphs.  Beyond that,
though, the summary starts to become self-defeating.  Garner
says that, ideally, a deep issue should not exceed 75 words.  He
must mean 75 words for each issue, especially when you
include the answer.  
I would not hesitate to call the summary just that, despite the
traditional lack of a heading to begin opinions.  Before I tested
the revised Wills opinion, a colleague urged me to drop the
heading, “Summary.”  Too radical, he said.  Well, maybe.  But if
business memos can have a heading, like “Executive Summary,”
why can’t opinions have one too?  Calling the opener a sum-
mary might even encourage writers to really summarize.  
That leads to my last point—the value of summaries not just
for the reader, but for the writer as well.  They help test the
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